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Migrant Workers and  
Fissured Workforces:  
CS Wind and the Dilemmas  
of Organizing Inter-Company Transfers in Canada1   
 
Abstract 
Canadian temporary foreign worker programs have been proliferating in recent years.  While 
much attention has deservedly focused on programs that target so-called low skilled workers, 
such as seasonal agricultural workers and live-in caregivers, other programs have been 
expanding, and have recently been re-organized into the International Mobility Program (IMP).  
Streams within the IMP are quite diverse and there are few legal limits on their growth.  One of 
these, inter-company transfers (ICTs), is not new, but it now extends beyond professional and 
managerial workers to more permeable and expansive categories.  As a result, unions 
increasingly face the prospect of organizing workplaces where ICTs and other migrant workers 
are employed alongside permanent employees, raising difficult legal issues and strategic 
dilemmas.  This article presents a detailed case study one union’s response to this situation. 
 
 







The use of temporary foreign (migrant) workers2 in Canada has been a contentious political topic 
for several years, resulting in ongoing rounds of program revision3 and stimulating a large body 
of critical academic research across several disciplines, often done in partnerships with migrant 
worker activists.4  Seasonal agricultural workers, live-in caregivers and domestics, and other 
low-skill workers in what since 2014 are labelled the Temporary Foreign Worker Program 
(TFWP) have been the focus of this controversy and study.  While there are good reasons for this 
attention, too narrow a focus on these workers (hereinafter referred to as TFWs) has left 
relatively unexamined a second category of migrant workers, in what since 2014 has been 
labeled the International Mobility Program (IMP).  This is unfortunate because while the TFWP 
has been shrinking in size in recent years, the IMP has been rapidly expanding (Mertins-
Kirkwood, 2015; Conference Board of Canada, 2016) and there is a significant likelihood that 
the number of IMP workers will continue to increase as Canada enters into new bi- and multi-
lateral trade deals that facilitate this kind of labour mobility (Mertins-Kirkwood, 2016; Curry, 
2015).    
 
The IMP consists of a number of different programs, one of which is intra-company transfers 
(ICTs).  ICTs are workers who have been employed in another country by a firm that also 
operates in Canada and who are temporarily transferred to the Canadian operation.   This 
arrangement intersects with a phenomenon that David Weil (2014) has recently drawn attention 
to in his book, The Fissured Workplace.  Weil’s book examines the changing structure of 
employer organizations and its implications for employment conditions and the enforcement of 
labour rights.   Essentially, by fissuring Weil refers to the phenomenon of employers shifting the 
boundaries of the firm inwards so that it reduces the number of workers who are under its direct 
control as employees.  Instead, the firm meets its labour requirements by contracting with other 
entities through franchising, sub-contracting or extended supply chain arrangements to produce 
and sell goods and services under its brand name.  The result is that responsibility for employees 
is also pushed outwards and diffused between multiple entities, often making it unclear which 
one is the legal employer or responsible for the employer’s legal obligations.   
 
Intra-company transfers can be understood to involve fissuring in two dimensions.  The first is 
the fissuring employer responsibility because of a blurring of the lines of legal responsibility 
between the parent firm and the sending and receiving subsidiaries.  As this case study 
demonstrates,  it may be difficult to determine which of these entities is the legal employer.  The 
other dimension of fissuring is at the level of workforce.  By combine in one location workers 
with several different immigration statuses and types of employment contracts, produces 
organized disorganization that creates difficult collective action problems for workers.  These 
problems are not unique to workplaces with migrant workers.  There is, for example, a 
developing literature on the challenges involved in organizing workplaces with permanent and 
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temporary help agency (THA) workers (Bartkiw 2012) and native born and immigrant workers 
(Bernsten and Lillie, 2016;Foster, 2016; Adler, Tapia and Turner, 2014; Alberti, Holgate and 




The CS Wind story brings these strands together.  It involves a Korean parent company, which 
transfers production workers from in Vietnamese to its Canadian branch plant, where THA 
workers were also present.  This was the situation confronting the Ironworkers Union when they 
were invited by the permanent Canadian workers to lead an organizing drive in the summer of 
2012.  The response of the employer, the strategy of the union and the resolution of the legal 
issues that arose before the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) are the subject of this paper 
and provide a window onto the changing landscape of Canadian labour mobility, its legal 
implications and the strategic dilemmas faced by unions.   
 
 
The Changing Landscape of Migrant Worker Programs in Canada  
 
There is no single migrant worker program in Canada.  Rather, since its inception, beginning 
with the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program in 1964, different programs have been created to 
respond to specific employer demands.  In 1973 the government created the Non-Immigrant 
Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP), a more general temporary worker program that 
required prospective employers to obtain a a Labour Market Opinion (LMO – now called a 
Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA)) that Canadians are not available for these positions.  
Work authorizations tied temporary foreign workers to their particular employers.  Within the 
NIEAP, separate streams developed, each with their own unique rules, including the Live-In 
Caregiver Program in 1981 and the low-skill program in 2002.  Separate streams for highly 
skilled workers were also created (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009; Macklin 1994; Satzewich 1991). 
 
The number of TFWs grew substantially over the turn of the twenty-first century.  In 1995, there 
were about 14,000 TFWs in Canada at the end of the year, while in in 2009, the peak year, the 
number increased to over 112,000 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014: Table 1.1; 
Yalnizyan, 2015).  This explosive growth raised concerns that employers were abusing the 
program to displace Canadian workers and/or create downward pressure on wages, particularly 
at the low end of the labour market (Gross, 2014).5  But most importantly, academics and 
advocates highlighted the vulnerability of TFWs to exploitation and the unfairness of denying 
most of these workers a pathway to permanent residency.  The fact that since 2006 the number of 
temporary foreign workers in all programs exceeded the number of economic immigrants 
(Faraday, 2012: 10-11) only emphasized the point that Canada was moving away from its 
3 
 
traditional policy of meeting labour market needs through permanent immigration toward a guest 
worker regime. 
 
 Because of the bad publicity generated by revelations of employer abuse of the TFWP and of 
the workers in them, as well as the effects of the recession, the number of TFWs obtaining 
permits annually declined from a peak of 128,384 in 2008 to 73,094 in 2015.  However, this 
decline did not result in fewer annual authorizations for migrant workers. To the contrary, since 
2008 the total number of annual signed authorizations has increased from 146,980 to 293,010 in 
2014, although there was a decline to 249,765 in 2015 (calculated from Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada 2014 & 2015).  The growth in migrant workers came from the International 
Mobility Programs, which comprise a diverse set of programs that facilitate the ability of non-
Canadians to work in Canada without having to obtain a LMIA.   In 1995 there were less than 
40,000 IMP workers present in Canada at the end of the year while in 2015 the number had 









 Table 1 below, prepared by the Canadian government, summarizes the principal differences 















Presence of TFWs and IMPs, 1995-2015. 
Sources: Citizenship and Immigration, Canada 




Temporary Foreign Worker Program 
Objective: Last resort for employers to fill 
jobs for which qualified Canadians are not 
available  
International Mobility Programs 
Objective: To advance Canada’s broad 
economic and cultural national interest  
• Based on employer demand to fill specific 
jobs  
• Not based on employer demand  
• Unilateral and discretionary  • Based largely on multilateral/bilateral 
agreements with other countries (e .g . 
NAFTA, GATS)  
• Employer must pass Labour Market Impact 
Assessment (formerly LMO)  
• No Labour Market Impact Assessment 
required  
• Lead department ESDC  • Lead department CIC  
• No reciprocity  • Based largely on reciprocity  
• Employer-specific work permits (TFWs tied 
to one employer)  
• Generally open permits (participants have 
greater mobility)  
• Majority are low-skilled (i .e . farm workers)  • Majority are high skill / high wage  
• Last and limited resort because no 
Canadians are available  
• Workers & reciprocity are deemed to be in 
the national economic and cultural interest  
• Main source countries are developing 
countries  
• Main source countries are highly 
developed  
 
Table 1.   
Comparison of Current Categories of TFWP and IMP. 





The IMP program is divided into two principal categories, Agreements and Canadian Interests.  
The Agreements category includes workers who are admitted pursuant to free trade (FT) and 
other international and federal-provincial agreements while the Canadian Interest category is a 
more diverse one which is divided into four sub-categories: significant benefit; reciprocal 
employment; competitiveness and public policy and charitable or religious.  Intra-company 
transfers enter Canada through both branches of the IMP.  A large percentage of Agreement 
workers enter Canada as ICTs pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which covers Canada, the United States and Mexico.  The agreement permits U.S. and Mexican 
citizens who have been continuously employed for at least a year by an enterprise in their home 
country to temporarily transfer to a parent, branch, subsidiary or affiliate of that enterprise in 
Canada.  They must be seeking employment in the Canadian operation in an executive, 
managerial or specialized knowledge capacity (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014a). 
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The maximum duration of the work permit is seven years for an executive or managerial 
employee and five years for a specialized knowledge worker.  There is no limit on the number of 
NAFTA ITCs, and at the end of 2015 there were 23,292 such workers in Canada, the large 
majority from the United States. (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2015).   
 
The other group of ICTs enter through the significant benefit sub-category of the Canadian 
Interests stream of the IMP.  The governing provisions are similar to those applicable to NAFTA 
intra-company transfers, but apply more broadly to any person employed by a multinational 
company outside of Canada who is seeking to work for the parent, or a subsidiary, branch or 
affiliate of that enterprise located in Canada.  The intra-company transferee must have been 
employed continuously for at least one year in the three year period preceding the application 
and be seeking to work in an executive, senior managerial or specialized knowledge capacity in 
Canada.  Generally, the company must have established a continuing and legitimate presence in 
Canada and where specialized knowledge workers are involved the company must ensure that 
the work is guided and directed by management at the Canadian operation.  Initial work permits 
are issued for one year but may be renewed for either seven years (executives and managers) or 
five years (specialized knowledge worker).  The permits are tied to the employer, an occupation 
and a location.  At the end of 2015 there were 17,755 IMP ICTs in Canada.  The combined 
number of ICTs present in Canada was 41,047, or about 16% of all IMP workers, making them 
the third largest category after competitiveness and public policy6 (122,823) and reciprocal 
employment (61,612) (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2015). 
 
The obvious question is whether the growth in the number of IMP workers generally or ICTs in 
particular should be worrisome for those who are concerned about the exploitation of temporary 
foreign workers and the impact of fissured workforces for workers’ collective action.  Sargeant 
and Tucker (2010) developed a multi-layered analysis for understanding the occupational health 
and safety vulnerabilities of temporary foreign workers which includes consideration of 
migration factors, migrant worker factors and receiving country factors.  Without elaborating, the 
vulnerability structure of IMP workers is different than that of TFWs.  In general, IMP workers 
have greater labour market mobility because their work permits are commonly more open, 
enabling them to work for any employer, although this is not true for  ICTs whose work permits 
are tied to their employer and their occupational category.  In regard to migrant worker factors, 
the majority of IMPs are higher skilled and are more likely to come from other developed 
countries than is the case for TFWs (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014: 15).  However, 
with regard to ICTs there has been a notable increase in the percentage who are specialized 
knowledge workers rather than executive or managerial.  A special data run by Statistics Canada 
(2017) found the percentage in this group had grown from about 15% in 1996 to 55% in 2016.  
Of course, specialized knowledge workers range across a wide number of occupations, some of 
whom may be more vulnerable than others. Finally, IMP workers are more likely to be recruited 
into positions well above the bottom of the Canadian labour market, unlike many streams of the 
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TFWP.  Therefore, it is fair to conclude that in general greater concern for TFWs than for IMPs 
is still warranted, notwithstanding that their share of all temporary foreign workers in Canada is 
declining.  However, the IMP is composed of many streams, which require separate evaluation to 
determine whether there are specific groups of workers for whom particular concern is 
warranted.7  A comprehensive examination of the IMP and the vulnerabilities it produces is 
outside the scope of this article, but the following case study provides at least for some groups a 
“middling” level of concern (Brenda, 2003: 209) is warranted.  
 
The issue of fissured workforces is tied to worker vulnerability insofar as it is vulnerable workers 
who most need the protection that collective action can provide.  Although the Canadian research 
is thin, there is little doubt the presence of a significant number of temporary foreign workers  
produce a complex environment for collective worker action.  Tucker and Jowett (2014) 
examined collective bargaining for TFWs in Canada and found in general there had been limited 
success organizing seasonal agricultural workers and workers in the low-skill stream.  However, 
they also found that when TFWs were hired into workplaces that were already organized some 
unions negotiated collective agreement provisions that addressed these workers’ particular needs, 
including arrangements that facilitated their path to permanent residence.  Foster (2014; also 
Foster, Taylor and Khan, 2015) studied the response of Canadian unions to TFWs and identified 
three temporally sequential approaches or narrative arcs.  The first, beginning 2006 when the 
influx of TFWs was rapidly increasing, was reactive and negative, denying there were local 
labour shortages and demonizing employers for using TFWs to drive down wages and avoid 
unions.  The second, beginning in the middle of 2007, shifted its focus onto the vulnerability of 
TFWs, their exploitation by employers and the failure of government to monitor and protect.  
The third narrative, dating from the 2008 recession, constructed a dual narrative of protecting 
Canadian jobs while also being concerned for the plight of TFWs.   
 
There is only one study of union organizing in the context of a workplace that employed both 
TFWs and permanent Canadian residents (Foster and Barnetson, 2010) and none that examine 
union organizing in a workplace with ICTs.  The CS Wind story, therefore, provides a first look 
at the complexities that can arise in this situation. 
 
The CS Wind Story 
CS Wind Corporation is a global wind tower company…we create the bright future for human 
[sic] and nature8 
 
The CS Wind story is a detailed case study of the attempt by the Iron Workers’ union to organize 
the Canadian branch-plant of CS Wind Korea (CSWK) in Windsor, Ontario.  The employer of 
the Canadian workers, CS Wind Canada (CSWC), fiercely resisted this effort and numerous 
legal disputes arose, leading the parties frequently to litigate before the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board (OLRB), which oversees Ontario’s collective bargaining law.  This resulted in many days 
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of hearings with testimony from employer representatives, union organizers and supporters and 
ICTs from CS Wind’s Vietnamese subsidiary (CSWV).  The Vietnamese workers became 
involved in the litigation not because of any choice of their own, but rather because they were 
called as witnesses by CSWC.  Their presence in the workplace created a strategic dilemma for 
the union and provided the employer with an avenue for trying to defeat the organizing drive.  
The story is told sequentially, beginning with the establishment of the Canadian branch plant and 
the contractual arrangements that governed the Vietnamese ICTs employment in Canada, 
followed by an examination of the decisions made by the union during the organizing drive and 
the resolution of the complex legal problems that arose as the employer and union maneuvered to 
determine the outcome of the organizing drive.  
  
CSWK is a Korean-based company founded in 1989 as the Choong Sang Corporation.  It built its 
first wind tower manufacturing plant in 2003 in Vietnam followed by a second facility China in 
2006.  Its sales of wind towers in North America grew and in 2011 it established CSWC and 
built a production facility in Windsor, Ontario, a rust belt border city that has suffered from 
severe job losses in manufacturing (Ryan, 2012).  CSWC began assembling its labour force in 
2011, including ICTs from CSWV, domestic hires and temporary help agency (THA) workers. 
With regard to the Vietnamese intra-company transfers, an application for visas and work 
permits was filed by CSWC in Ho Chi Minh City in September 2011.  The stated reason for each 
visa was to provide training to Canadian workers regarding “the interpretation and the 
implementation of alternative energy technical fabrication and assembly processes; work flow 
and administration processes; and business systems, reporting requirements and customer 
interaction” (CS Wind, 2014: para 65). The application also stated that while on assignment in 
Canada, the Vietnamese workers would receive a monthly salary paid by CSWV in Vietnamese 
currency deposited to accounts in Vietnam, that the Vietnamese workers would continue to 
participate in CSWV health and benefit plans and that CSWV would be responsible for the 
workers’ expenses, including accommodations and round-trip airfare.  Salary levels would be 
consistent with Vietnamese salary levels, which ranged from $140 a month at the low end, $175 
in the mid-range and up to $421 for one worker at the high end. Income taxes were deducted and 
paid in Vietnam, as were union dues which were remitted to the Vietnamese union that 
represented them in Vietnam (CS Wind, 2014: para 76).9  
 
The visa application was successful and work permits were issued.  The permit authorized the 
workers to work for CS Wind at their stated occupation in the Windsor location.  The permit 
holders were prohibited from attending any educational institution or taking any academic, 
professional or vocational training courses while in Canada.  The visas were initially issued for 
either five or ten months. Ultimately thirty-one Vietnamese workers were transferred to CSWC 
by 2012, when production began, one group arriving in 2011 and another in 2012.  CSWC 
arranged for them to be housed together, for their transportation to and from work and for 
lunches to be provided by a local Vietnamese restaurant.  They were also provided with 
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allowances for telephone, personal hygiene, laundry, meals and spending money.  In April 2012, 
CSWC applied for and received one year extensions for those workers whose permits would be 
expiring in the near future.  In that application, CSWC stated that the Vietnamese workers would 
be paid approximately $25 per hour plus allowances and that CSWV would pay these amounts. 
Subsequent permit extensions were sought and obtained (CS Wind, 2014: paras 70, 75 & 79). 
 
The actual terms and conditions of the Vietnamese workers apparently varied from those stated 
in the visa applications and was the subject of testimony in the OLRB proceedings.  It is apparent 
from the testimony that local management actually knew very little about what the Vietnamese 
workers were being paid.  The clearest evidence of their actual terms of employment came from 
the testimony of three Vietnamese workers called by CSWC, Nguyen Van Long, Nguyen Huu 
Huong and Dang Van Vinh.  Each worker was recruited by CSWV and promised they would be 
paid double their Vietnamese salary in Vietnamese currency deposited into a Vietnamese bank 
account which their families could access.  They participated in CSWV’s social and health 
insurance plan and were covered by the collective agreement between the Vietnamese union and 
CSWV.  The OLRB calculated the actual pay of the Vietnamese workers in November 2012, 
which ranged between $950 and $1,600 Canadian a month, plus allowances of about $600 a 
month.  The OLRB found that the Vietnamese worked long hours, frequently more than 60 hours 
in a week, for which they were paid overtime in Vietnam (CS Wind, 2014: paras 80-97).  
Including salary and allowances, and assuming a forty hour week, the highest paid workers 
earned about $13.00 an hour, slightly more than the minimum wage at the time which was 
$10.25.  However, once overtime hours are included, it is probable that all the Vietnamese 
workers were being paid less than the Ontario minimum wage.10 
 
The number of THA workers employed in production and janitorial services at CSWC is 
unknown.  However, according Joel Thibodeau, who started working at CSWC in January 2012 
and became a lead organizer, most of those workers were on long-term assignment and hoped to, 
and many did, become permanent CSWC workers (Thibodeau Interview, 2016).  No evidence 
was presented on their terms and conditions of employment.  It is also not clear how many 
domestic production workers were employed by CSWC by the summer of 2012, but it was 
certainly over 200 (CS Wind, 2012b and 2013a).  By then the Canadian workers were becoming 
increasingly dissatisfied with working conditions.  There were weekly meetings with 
management, which promised improvements that were not made.  Local managers seemed to 
lack decision-making authority.  The company rejected a proposal to have an employee 
committee represent workers, while unhappiness over shift scheduling, differences in wage rates, 
and disciplinary practices grew.  A number of workers got together, including Thibodeau, and 
decided to organize with Ironworkers, Local 721.11 Thibodeau became an active inside organizer 





From the outset the workers and the union had to consider who they were going to organize.  It 
was clear that the THA workers would have to be included since under Ontario law it was very 
likely CSWC would be found to be their employer for collective bargaining purposes.  The 
question of the Vietnamese workers was more complicated, both for practical and for legal 
reasons.  At a practical level, although the Vietnamese workers worked alongside the domestic 
workers and also played a role in training, communication was limited since many of the 
Vietnamese workers had poor English language skills.  As well, they were socially segregated 
and highly sequestered by the company: they lived together; they were transported to and from 
work together; had their lunches brought to them by the employer, etc.  And last but not least, 
some of the domestic workers felt resentment toward the Vietnamese workers, which at one 
point manifested itself in an offensive posting on a Facebook page allegedly used for organizing 
purposes, which was subsequently removed (CS Wind, 2013: para. 15).  Part of the resentment 
stemmed from the employer’s claim that they needed the Vietnamese workers because local 
workers did not have the specialized knowledge and skill required to perform the work. Not only 
did this strike at the workers’ sense of their own abilities, but as time wore on, the claim rang 
increasingly hollow and some viewed the Vietnamese workers as low wage competitors taking 
jobs that should have gone to unemployed workers in the Windsor area.  When these feelings 
were overlaid on top of the multiple barriers that inhibited communication between the 
Vietnamese and the Canadian workers, building solidarity that would facilitate organizing was 
difficult (Thibodeau and Barnes Interviews, 2016).12 Further, as a legal matter, the Vietnamese 
workers had contracts of employment with CSWV, the terms of which were not clear even to 
local management.  In these circumstances, organizers questioned whether it was legally or 
practically possible to include the Vietnamese workers in the bargaining unit and bargain on their 
behalf.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, it would be overly simplistic to characterize the response of the 
Canadian workers and union organizers as reactive and negative, to use the categories developed 
by Foster (2014).  Organizers also perceived that the Vietnamese workers were being exploited 
and paid significantly less than the Canadians and could benefit from being unionized.  As a 
result, they made some  effort to distribute union literature, previously translated into 
Vietnamese for an organizing drive at a different location where Vietnamese immigrants were 
employed.  Lash Ray reports that organizers attempted to go to the building where the 
Vietnamese workers were housed but that they were turned away by a CSWC manager from 
Korea.  On another occasion he reports an attempt was made to leave the translated literature in 
the lunch room but the organizer was reprimanded and the literature was removed.  It is 
unknown whether any of this literature got into the hands of the Vietnamese workers, but it is 
certain that none of them tried to contact or join the union.  Organizers suspected that the 
Vietnamese workers may also have been fearful that if they became involved with the union they 
would be sent home (Thibodeau and Ray Interviews, 2016). 
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It is not entirely clear when the decision was made to focus exclusively on the Canadian workers, 
but it must have occurred fairly early in the organizing drive and was based on strategic 
considerations.  Because none of the Vietnamese workers had joined the union, their inclusion in 
the proposed bargaining unit would have made it more difficult to reach the 40% threshold level 
of support necessary to trigger a certification vote.  Moreover, even if the union passed the 
threshold, winning the election would have been more difficult since it was assumed that the 
Vietnamese workers might be mobilized by the employer to vote against the union.  And finally, 
even if the union won the certification election for a more comprehensive unit, negotiating an 
agreement that addressed the concerns and interests of the Vietnamese workers, who were 
working pursuant to Vietnamese employment contracts and in Canada without a secure status, 
would have presented serious practical problems. 
 
The organizing drive among the Canadian workers quickly gained momentum and the union 
filed a certification application on October 4, 2012.  The proposed bargaining unit excluded 
“training personnel” which clearly referred to the Vietnamese workers.  The employer responded 
to the application with three lines of attack.  The first two were quite conventional. First, it 
alleged the union under- estimated of the number of employees in its proposed bargaining unit 
and therefore failed to reach the 40% membership threshold necessary to get a certification vote.  
Second, it challenged the union’s proposed bargaining unit as not appropriate for collective 
bargaining because it excluded the Vietnamese ICT workers and others.  The employer’s third 
objection, however, was very unusual.  It alleged that the exclusion of the Vietnamese workers 
was discriminatory and in violation of the province’s Human Rights Code (1990).  While 
normally human rights claims are adjudicated before the Human Rights Tribunal, the Labour 
Relations Act (1995) provides that if a union discriminates on a prohibited ground it cannot be 
certified as a bargaining agent to represent workers.  The allegation therefore was of great 
concern to the union, not just because it offended their perception of themselves as fighters for 
social justice, but also because it would have been fatal to their certification application (CS 
Wind, 2012).  The employer’s claim, however, was not without its own ironies.  After all, it was 
the employer that sequestered the Vietnamese workers and paid them lower wages for doing 
work that was supposedly more skilled than the work performed by the domestic employees.  
This was the beginning of the litigation mash-up that produced some very strange and upside 
down arguments.   
 
The union was concerned about whether it had properly estimated the number of employees in 
its proposed bargaining unit and withdrew its application in order to give it time to recruit more 
members (CS Wind, 2012a). The employer’s response also caused the union to rethink its 
approach to the Vietnamese workers.  It prepared and translated into Vietnamese another 
document, “Your Rights in Canada” (Appendix A) which it attempted to distribute to the 
Vietnamese workers.  The document advised the Vietnamese workers that they had the right to 
equal treatment without prejudice, to join a union, to be paid the same as someone doing the 
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same work and to not perform unsafe work.  It also offered the union’s assistance in addressing 
rights violations or negotiating better terms and conditions of employment.  The penultimate 
paragraph responded directly to the employer’s allegation that the union discriminated:  
 
CS Wind says we discriminate against the Vietnamese workers and that is not true.  We 
wish for you to have what all members of the union have, good wages, benefits and a safe 
place to work. 
 
The brochure concluded advising the Vietnamese workers that could call the Ironworkers in 
confidence and that a Vietnamese speaker would call them back.   
 
It was also around this time that the union considered organizing the Vietnamese workers as a 
separate bargaining unit and distributed a third document, also translated into Vietnamese, 
headed “Warmest Welcome.” The union advised the Vietnamese workers it wished to represent 
the interests of all workers at CS Wind and understood that the Vietnamese workers needed a 
union “even more than other workers at the CS Plant” because of their inability to work 
elsewhere: 
 
The IRONWORKERS UNION know that workers from Vietnam have unique concerns 
and think Vietnamese workers should have their own union bargaining unit and union so 
that you are able to get your employer to address the workplace problems shared by 
workers transferred from Vietnam… 
 
The only way the problems faced by Vietnamese workers transferred to Canada will get 
better is if you join together to form a union to demand change. 
 
The Vietnamese workers were given the name of a Vietnamese member of the Ironworkers 
working for a different employer in the Windsor area who they could contact.  It is unclear how 
much effort the union devoted to getting this literature into the hands of the Vietnamese workers 
and, given the difficulties identified previously, it is unlikely it reached them.  In any event, no 
Vietnamese workers contacted the union. 
 
On November 19, 2012 the union filed another certification application for a proposed 
bargaining unit that excluded “persons working pursuant to an intra-company transfer program 
and/or employees of CS Wind Vietnam.”  The employer responded to this application as it had to 
the first.  The board deferred consideration of the employer’s objections and ordered that an 
election be held on November 26.  It defined the voting constituency broadly to permit all 
production employees to vote save and except persons above the rank of foreman.  Disputed 
ballots were to be segregated and the ballot box would be sealed until the outstanding issues had 




Before the certification election, the employer held a meeting with employees on a Sunday, 
which workers were paid to attend.  At that meeting, Joel Thibodeau asked why the Vietnamese 
workers were being paid lower wages and were having their terms and conditions of employment 
dictated to them.    CSWC’s legal counsel, David McNevin’s lengthy response castigated the 
union for seeking to carve the Vietnamese workers out of the bargaining unit (CS Wind, 2015: 
para 72).13  In the certification election 187 ballots were cast, of which 60 were segregated 
pending the outcome of various challenges. 
 
Much litigation followed, including allegations of unfair labour practices leading up to and 
following the vote and of occupational health and safety reprisals (eg., CS Wind, 2013a & 2015).  
These aspects of the case are not examined since they did not touch on the question of the 
Vietnamese ICTs.  There was, however, the employer’s allegation that the union had unlawfully 
discriminated against the Vietnamese workers and therefore had disqualified itself from being 
certified.  The union challenged the employer’s standing to bring the claim and challenged 
whether a prima facie case had been made out.  In response, the employer alleged that a 
Facebook page used in the original organizing drive contained offensive comments about the 
Vietnamese workers and claimed that the union had made minimal efforts to translate its 
organizing materials during the membership drive that resumed after the first application was 
withdrawn.  These claims were additional to the assertion that the exclusion of the Vietnamese 
workers from the proposed bargaining unit was itself discriminatory.   
 
The board ruled that the Facebook allegation was too vague since it failed to identify the 
impugned comments or who had made them, but the Board did allow the employer to introduce 
evidence regarding the translation of written material and the bargaining unit description.  
However, the employer ultimately chose not pursue its human rights claim, leaving the position 
of the Vietnamese workers to be addressed on the basis of whether the union’s proposed unit was 
appropriate for collective bargaining (CS Wind, 2013). 
 
Given the large number of issues before the OLRB, it needed to decide on the order in which 
they would be considered and chose to start with the bargaining unit issue.  A little labour law 
background is essential here.  Ontario labour law requires a union applying for certification to 
define of the group of employees it wishes to represent.  However, the labour board must find the 
union’s proposed bargaining unit to be an appropriate one and the employer is given the 
opportunity to challenge the unit proposed by the union and suggest a different one.  In recent 
years the OLRB has taken the view that the bargaining unit proposed by the union does not have 
to be the most appropriate one, based on some notion of what an ideal unit would be, but rather 
that the employees share a community of interest and that the unit that will not cause the 
employer significant industrial relations problems.  However, there is a background condition 
that must be satisfied and that is that all members of the bargaining unit must be employed by the 
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employer (Adams, 2017: 7.2).  As a result, it had to be determined who was the employer of the 
Vietnamese workers for collective bargaining purposes, CSWC or CSWV.14  
 
In many contexts, it is the named employer who argues it is not the legal employer in order to 
avoid the ensuing obligations.  Here, however, the situation was reversed; CSWC was arguing 
that it was the legal employer of the Vietnamese workers, while the union was arguing that it was 
not and that they were employed by CSWV.  As is often the case in litigation, these positions 
were taken for purely strategic purposes.  For the CSWC, a finding that it was the employer was 
essential in order for it to be able to argue that the Vietnamese ITCs must be included in the 
bargaining unit, while for the union a finding that CSWV was the employer would preclude the 
Vietnamese workers from being in the bargaining unit.  The downside of the union’s position, 
however, was that if their argument succeeded the Vietnamese workers could not be certified as 
a separate bargaining unit either, although that was a remote prospect in any event. 
 
Ontario uses a “comprehensive” test to determine the ‘true’ employer for the purposes of 
collective bargaining.  The Supreme Court of Canada devised this test in the context of a case 
involving THA workers, where the question was whether the agency or the client was the 
employer for the purposes of collective bargaining (Pointe Claire 1997, para. 48). 
 
According to this more comprehensive approach, the legal subordination and integration 
into the business criteria should not be used as exclusive criteria for identifying the real 
employer.  In my view, in a context of collective bargaining…it is essential that 
temporary employees be able to bargain with the party that exercises the greatest control 
over all aspects of their work – and not only over the supervision of their day to day 
work….Without drawing up an exhaustive list of factors pertaining to the employer-
employee relationship, I shall mention the following examples: the selection process, 
hiring, training, discipline, evaluation, supervision, assignment of duties, remuneration 
and integration into the business. 
 
The OLRB reviewed the evidence in relation to these factors and found that the Vietnamese 
workers were hired and trained by CSWV and indeed had relatively long service with CSWV, 
some having previously worked stints at CS Wind’s Chinese branch plant.  The decision to send 
them to work at the Windsor branch plant was made by the head office in Korea, but the 
Vietnamese workers had been asked to go to Canada by their Vietnamese supervisors.  The terms 
and conditions of their employment were made in Vietnam, including a retention bonus for each 
month they worked in Canada, as well as higher rates of pay.  There was no evidence that CSWC 
had any role in setting their terms and conditions of employment.  Indeed, local managers did not 
know the terms of the Vietnamese workers’ contracts, even regarding what constituted regular 
hours of work or overtime, and their hours of work were separately recorded by a different 
system than the one used for the domestic workers.  In terms of work, the OLRB found that the 
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Vietnamese workers were doing the same work as the domestic workers, with the same tools and 
equipment, and reporting to the same supervisors and managers.  They also generally worked in 
teams with the domestic workers.   
 
Given this fissured responsibility structure, who exercised the greatest control over all aspects of 
the work?  The answer is far from obvious, but the OLRB had to decide and it determined it was 
CSWC.  The OLRB explained its conclusion in a brief paragraph (CS Wind, 2014: para 111). 
 
It is CSWC which arranged their accommodation; their transportation to and from the 
plant; had meals delivered to the plant for them; paid them various cash allowances; 
directed their schedules and work; has made all arrangements for the extension of their 
work permits; and it seems that it will be CSWC which will ultimately determine when 
they can return to Vietnam.  It is noteworthy that two of conditions of the work permits 
are that the Vietnamese Workers must continue to work for CSWC and at the Windsor 
plant. 
 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, later in its judgment the OLRB emphasized the significance of 
the fact that these workers’ terms and conditions of employment were set in Vietnam for the 
purposes of collective bargaining (CS Wind, 2014: paras138-39). 
 
Even though, for the purposes of this application, the Board has found that CSWV is not 
the employer of the Vietnamese Workers, the practical reality appears to be that CSWV 
plays a major role in their terms and conditions of employment. However, the Union 
would not have that company at the bargaining table and have no legal means of getting it 
to participate in negotiations. 
 
Even if the Union is able to conclude a collective agreement for a bargaining unit that 
included both types of workers, it argued that it would have no practical means of 
enforcing wage payments of health insurance benefits in Vietnam.  If a Vietnamese 
worker was disciplined or terminated from employment and therefore returned to 
Vietnam with the consequent loss of a work permit, the Union would have no way to get 
the worker back to Canada for grievance arbitration, or in the event of a reinstatement, 
would not be able to enforce the remedy. 
 
In any event, based on its finding that CSWC was the true employer, the board then turned its 
mind to question of a bargaining unit that excluded the Vietnamese workers was an appropriate 
one.  The employer’s claim that such a bargaining unit unlawfully discriminated on the basis of 
ethnic origin had been dropped by this point, so the matter was addressed from a conventional 
industrial relations perspective, which focuses on whether the employees share a sufficient 
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community of interest and whether the proposed  unit would cause the employer serious 
industrial relations problems (Hospital for Sick Kids, 1985).   
 
Ironically, the employer argued that the two groups shared a community of interest because the 
Vietnamese and domestic workers performed the same work and  had the same skill set, even 
though the Vietnamese workers were more highly skilled because of their greater work 
experience.  This position was accepted by the board, notwithstanding that it was somewhat at 
odds with the employer’s justification for the work permits -- that the Vietnamese workers were 
needed to train Canadian workers who lacked the skill to perform the job.  However, the board 
ultimately concluded there was no community of interest between the domestic and the 
Vietnamese workers because of the differences in the levels and types of compensation and 
allowances and because the Vietnamese workers were only in Canada temporarily.  “As such 
their expectations or interests are perforce going to be quite different from those of domestic 
workers who have long-term employment interests” (CS Wind, 2014: para 123).   
 
The board was also sympathetic to the union’s claim that it would be hard-pressed to meet its 
duty of fair representation to the 31 Vietnamese workers and the approximately 160 domestic 
workers (CS Wind, 2014: para 124 & 128). 
 
The union would have no real way of addressing the fact that the majority of the 
bargaining unit would not share the same interests or terms and conditions of 
employment.  The Board has to be mindful of a union’s ability to bargain for a viable unit 
and it is understandable that the competing interests of these two groups go well beyond 
the usual issues between groups of workers. 
 
If the Vietnamese Workers are included in the bargaining unit, it will be difficult for the 
Union to bargain for this balkanized group in light of their different terms and conditions 
of employment and security of tenure with the employer. 
 
With regard to the question of whether excluding the Vietnamese workers from the bargaining 
unit would generate serious labour relations problems for the employer, the Board was cognizant 
that the employer had structured the workforce as it had for its own purposes (CS Wind, 2014: 
para127). 
 
…CSWC has apparently structured the workplace to meet its production needs, and has 
availed itself of the Temporary Foreign Worker program to bring 31 Vietnamese Workers 
to Windsor to both train and to supplement its domestic workforce until the domestic 
workers have been trained to the employer’s satisfaction.  As such, it has organized the 
workplace as it finds administratively convenient for its production purposes….CSWC 
has thus created a fractured workforce in which there are a large number of permanent 
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domestic workers, and a smaller, but not insignificant number of temporary foreign 
workers, all of whom are doing essentially the same work. 
 
In short, it found that the employer “has structured its workforce with the very division which it 
wishes the Board to ignore.” To emphasize the point, the OLRB noted that while the federal 
government’s immigration policy mandated that intra-company transfers did not have the same 
labour market or job mobility as Canadian workers, it had been the choice of CS Wind to provide 
the Vietnamese workers with different terms and conditions of employment than its other 
production workers (CS Wind, 2014: para 132 &138).   
 
Finally, perhaps to address the earlier allegations made by the employer that the union had 
unlawfully discriminated against the Vietnamese workers by excluding them from the proposed 
bargaining unit, the OLRB explicitly stated that the basis for its determination that the union’s 
proposed unit was appropriate was the large difference in the circumstances of the two groups of 
workers and the difficulties this would cause the union, and not because of the Vietnamese 
workers’ national origin or immigration status (CS Wind, 2014: para 146). 
 
While this is the end of the story for our purposes, the decision in this case did not resolve the 
certification application, but merely allowed the ballots to be counted and defined the bargaining 
unit for which the union needed to demonstrate majority support.  The union lost the election but 
had earlier filed unfair labour practice complaints alleging that the employer had engaged in 
unlawful actions that prevented the employees from expressing their true wishes.  After lengthy 
hearings, the OLRB upheld the union’s complaint and determined that a remedial certification 
was the appropriate remedy in the circumstances (CS Wind, 2015; Thompson, 2015).  Early in 
2016 the union and the employer reached a first collective agreement (Battagello, 2016). By 
then, the Vietnamese intra-company transfer workers were gone, so even if they had been 
included in the bargaining unit, they would not have benefited from the collective agreement. 
 
Conclusion and Reflections 
 
The rapid growth in the use of migrant workers in Canada attracted much critical attention, 
largely focused on the TFWP and particularly its lower-skilled streams.  However, as this article 
demonstrates, an overly narrow focus on these particularly vulnerable workers may leave 
unexamined new and growing streams of migrant workers under the International Mobility 
Program.  While this program is quite diverse, researchers need to  more carefully assess 
particular sub-groups and, where appropriate, make visible their labour market vulnerabilities.  
As well, and particularly for vulnerable migrant workers, it is important to consider the 
implications of and responses to workplace and workforce fissuring for both migrant and non-




Intra-company transfers are not a new form of labour mobility in Canada, but until fairly recently 
the number of workers involved was relatively small and most were professionals and 
executives.  The rapid growth in the number of ICTs through both the Agreements and the 
Canadian Interests branches of IMP and the possibility of continued expansion, is good reason to 
scrutinize this stream more closely.  While the program is currently restricted to workers in high 
skill categories, its boundaries are permeable and the situation that arose at CS Wind could 
become more common, although that will be determined by the response of the federal 
government to political pressure.     
 
On the one hand, the Canadian government was responsive to concerns about the potential to 
exploit the specialized knowledge worker category to transfer lower skilled workers as ICTs.   
As a result, it introduced more rigorous assessment criteria for determining who qualified under 
this heading.  This included a requirement that applicants establish on a balance of probabilities 
that the worker possesses a high standard of specialized knowledge, including both company 
specific and advanced expertise.  As well, at least for non-NAFTA ICTs, the government states it 
will examine the wage currently being paid, expecting to see an above average salary that 
reflects the worker’s specialized knowledge (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014c).  This 
may have contributed to a decline in the number of ICTs entering Canada since its peak in 2013, 
including a reduction in the number of specialized knowledge workers (Statistics Canada, 2017). 
 
On the other hand, future trade agreements could open up the categories of workers permitted to 
enter as ICTs or in other IMP categories.  For example, while the main text of the TPP contains 
fairly general language about temporary entry for business people, including ICTs, Canada’s 
schedule of specific country commitments in Annex 12-A is quite expansive.  In addition to 
investors, business visitors and ICTs (including a broadly defined sub-category of specialists), 
Canada also agrees to admit on a temporary basis listed “professionals and technicians” on a 
party by party basis.  The definitions for these groups include workers engaged in occupations 
that have a National Occupational Classification skill level of O (Managerial), A (Professional) 
or B (Technical).  The inclusion of workers with skill level B expands upon previous trade 
agreements which were limited to workers from skill levels O and A, 15 and includes a wide 
range of listed occupations, such as contractors and tradespeople in various fields.  Moreover, 
these workers are not ICTs who must have been employed by a subsidiary or parent, but may be 
hired by any Canadian company (Mertins-Kirkwood, 2016; Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, 2016: Annex 12-A).  Although the future of the TPP is now in doubt, even if it does 
not come into force it could provide a template for future bi-lateral or multi-lateral trade 
agreements governing labour mobility. 
 
The article also makes visible the legal and strategic difficulties unions face when attempting to 
organize workplaces with migrant workers generally and intra-company transfers in particular.  
As noted, the legal arguments in CS Wind were upside down: CSWC initially alleged that the 
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union was unlawfully discriminating against the Vietnamese workers, when it was the party 
directly and most obviously responsible for the differential treatment; that it was the legal 
employer when it is far more common for companies to argue they are not the legal employer in 
order to avoid the legal responsibility for workers; and that a more inclusive bargaining unit 
should be required when its underlying goal was union avoidance, not more effective and 
efficient collective bargaining.  The union’s arguments were also upside down.  Its claim that the 
Vietnamese workers’ legal employer was CSWV would have deprived these workers of the 
benefit of much of Ontario’s protective labour and employment laws and the argument that 
temporary foreign workers could be excluded from the bargaining unit impeded their access to 
unionization, undermining the broad worker solidarity on which industrial union strength is 
based.   
 
Of course, these legal positions were primarily driven by short-term tactical considerations: the 
employer wanted to prevent its production workforce from unionizing; the union wanted to 
improve its odds of organizing a new bargaining unit.  While the situation did not present a 
strategic dilemma for the employer, who was singularly interested in union avoidance, it posed a 
difficult dilemma for the union, which is not easily resolved.  On the one hand, the union has an 
interest in organizing bargaining units that it can get certified by winning majority support.  To 
achieve that goal, the union may seek to exclude groups of workers that it finds particularly 
difficult to reach or convince of the merits of unionization or who the majority of employees may 
resent.  On the other hand, unions should be and often are quite concerned about the exploitation 
of vulnerable workers generally and of migrant workers in particular.  How can and should 
unions respond when the achievement of their shorter-term organizing objectives conflict with 
their longer-term interest in building inclusive solidarity? 
 
To a significant extent, these strategic dilemmas are produced by the underlying structures of 
collective bargaining regimes.   The function of  trade unions in North American collective 
bargaining regimes is narrowly representational as opposed to regulatory (Ewing 2005).   As a 
result, to gain representational rights unions must organize enterprise or sub-enterprise 
bargaining units .  This arrangement requires them to make a strategic decision about which 
workers can be successfully organized, and thus arises the problem of whether to include TFWs 
who may be more difficult to recruit.  But, as well, they also need to make some legal judgments.  
First, they need correctly to identify the employer of the workers they wish to organize, taking 
into account that in a fissured workforce, not all employees will have the same employer.  
Second, because North American regimes do not permit unions unilaterally to determine the 
group of workers they wish to represent, unions must also make  a legal assessment of whether 
their preferred group ey choose will constitute an appropriate bargaining unit in the eyes of a 




To date, Canadian labour boards have only dealt with a small number of cases involving 
temporary foreign workers and CS Wind is the first instance in which it had to consider the 
specific situation of ICTs.  Most of its previous judgments have involved seasonal agricultural 
workers (Tucker and Jowett, 2014).  With regard to the question of the legal employer, labour 
boards have rejected arguments by farm owners  that they are not the employer of SAWs because 
many terms and conditions of their employment are established by the inter-governmental 
agreements.   
 
With regard to appropriate bargaining units, the issue has rarely arisen, in part because most 
certification applications have been for units comprised entirely of SAWs, and farmers have 
rarely argued that the proposed unit is inappropriate because it failed to include their Canadian 
employees, where such workers are present.  In the one case an employer did make that 
argument the board rejected it on the basis that the terms and conditions of the SAWs were 
sufficiently distinct to justify separate certification (Sidhu, 2010).16  The bargaining unit issue 
also became contentious in Quebec when its collective bargaining law only allowed agricultural 
workers to organize if the employer hired at least three year-round employees.  Under this 
regime, the labour board approved both separate and combined bargaining units. 17 
 
The emerging legal framework points to likelihood that Canadian firms using temporary foreign 
workers, including intra-company transfers, will be found to be their employers, but unions will 
be able to choose whether or not to include temporary foreign workers, including intra-company 
transfers, in the bargaining units they attempt to organize since either configuration is likely to be 
found appropriate.  Thus, while the structure of the law creates strategic dilemmas, it does not 
resolve them one way or another.  Unions must still decide how to proceed. 
 
Of course, in principle unions should seek inclusive bargaining units.  This would give 
temporary foreign workers terms and conditions of employment comparable to those of domestic 
workers, including protection against unjust discipline and discharge for the duration of their 
work permits.  As well, unions then have the opportunity to negotiate contract provisions to 
address some specific vulnerabilities resulting from these workers’ precarious immigration 
status.  For example, special remedies, such as liquidated damages, could be negotiated to deter 
employers from wrongfully repatriating workers or to properly compensate those who are.   
 
But it is not enough to espouse principles if the obstacles that stand in the way of their realization 
are formidable and very unlikely to be overcome.  The Ironworkers clearly faced a very tough 
situation: the Vietnamese workers were difficult to reach because of language, cultural and 
employer-created barriers; their temporary status reduced the potential benefits of unionization 
while increasing the their vulnerability to employer retaliation; and Canadian worker support for 
their inclusion could not be taken for granted.  Moreover, even if the union had succeeded in 
organizing an inclusive bargaining unit it is not obvious that it would have been able to negotiate 
20 
 
more favourable arrangements for the Vietnamese workers without putting their continued 
employment in Canada at risk.    
 
Finally, there is the question of the preferences of the Vietnamese workers.  They had returned to 
Vietnam by the time this research was conducted and so there was no opportunity for them to be 
interviewed.  There is also little we can infer from the fact that they never responded to the 
union’s outreach efforts.  Did they have no interest in being a part of the union; did they not feel 
welcomed; or did they fear employer retaliation?  Three Vietnamese workers were called by 
CSWC to testify before the OLRB about their recruitment in Vietnam, the terms of the 
Vietnamese contracts they signed terms and the work they performed in Ontario, but they were 
not, and could not have been, asked about their attitude toward unionization and in any event this 
was hardly a setting in which they could have expressed their ‘true’ wishes.   
 
So what is to be done?  There are no easy answers within the parameters of the North American 
system of enterprise certifications and collective bargaining.  In principle, these strategic 
dilemmas could be reduced in a labour law regime that assigned unions a regulatory role, 
establishing terms and conditions at a sectoral level that benefit all workers employed in the 
sector.  In such a regime, unions would not have to organize bargaining units taking into account 
whether a particular group of workers was organisable while correctly identifying the employer 
and properly assessing whether their chosen bargaining unit would be found to be appropriate.    
 
However, regulatory bargaining systems that exist solely at a national scale may not resolve the 
problem if the law permits the migrant worker to remain classified as the employee of their home 
employer.  In this situation, the ICT would remain outside the sectoral agreement, resulting in 
labour market vulnerability and producing fissured workforces.  This is the problem that 
confronted European Union (EU) members and led to the 1996 Posted Workers Directive.  The 
Directive contemplates that posted workers will remain the employees of the sending company 
and so are subject to the sending countries laws. However, to avoid social dumping, the Directive 
provides that posted workers are entitled to a set of core rights in the host Member state 
including minimum wages and maximum hours of work laws, among others (Posted Workers 
Directive, 1996).  Controversial interpretations of the Posted Workers Directive have reduced 
this floor of rights but recently a reform measure was presented by the European Commission 
that would entitle posted workers to equal pay and working conditions as local workers 
(European Commission, 2016).  The Directive does much less to protect collective bargaining 
rights.  Indeed, the European Court of Justice infamously held that collective bargaining 
agreements are a potential barrier to trade so that unions are severely limited in the actions they 
can take to enforce their terms in regard to posted workers (Davies, 2008).  Moreover, to the 
extent that enterprise bargaining displaces sectoral bargaining, the Directive does not adequately 
deal with the situation of posted workers who are inserted into a non-union setting and how their 




In sum, while many ICTs are high level executives and managers for whom their temporary 
transfer is  a stepping stone to advancement, the boundaries of this migrant worker are permeable 
and liable to expand to include lower skilled and vulnerable workers.  When this occurs, as in the 
case of CS Wind, the result is fissured employers and fragmented workforces.  In this context, it 
is a challenge to insure that ICTs and other migrant workers  receive adequate social protection 
and have access to effective collective representation.  Labour clauses in trade agreements are 
unlikely to provide much protection (Tham and Ewing 2016).  The application of local 
employment law to ICTs and other TFWs goes some distance towards meeting these goals, 
however, where collective bargaining regimes assign unions a representational function, and 
unions must gain representation rights at the enterprise level they face strategic dilemmas over 
the incorporation of temporary foreign workers into bargaining units.  These dilemmas are 
reduced where unions exercise a regulatory function, but unless the condition of ICTs and other 
migrant workers is effectively addressed at a transnational scale, the problems of fissuring and 
fragmentation are likely to recur.   
 
Legal arrangements are thus responsible for the structures that produce strategic dilemmas and 
unions must grapple with the hand they have been dealt.  The outline of a principled approach is 
clear: inclusive organizing and bargaining should be the union’s goal, but conditions on the 
ground, may limit what can be achieved, even when unions make a serious effort to involve ICTs 
and other migrant workers.  This case study epitomizes the strategic dilemmas that the Canadian 
collective bargaining regime creates, but, dare I say, the answers to those dilemmas are not 
blowing in CS Wind. 
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1 1 This paper is written with the support of the On the Move Partnership, which is a project of 
the SafetyNet Center for Occupational Health and Safety Research at Memorial University.  It is 
supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council through its Partnership 
Grants funding opportunity,  the Research and Development Corporation of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, the Canada Foundation for Innovation and multiple universities and community 
partners across Canada and elsewhere.   Thanks to Mary Hurley for her research assistance, Alec 
Stromdahl for his editorial assistance and Jason Foster for comments on an earlier draft. 
2 A note on terminology is required.  Migrant worker is a broad category that is variously used to 
describe immigrant workers who have the right to stay in where they have located and workers 
whose immigration status is temporary and who will be required to leave when their work permit 
expires.   In Canada, the common term for these temporary workers was, until recently, 
“temporary foreign workers.”  However, in 2014 the Canadian government formalized a 
distinction between two types of temporary foreign work programs, one called the Temporary 
Foreign Workers Program (TFWP) and the other the International Mobility Program (IMP).  To 
avoid confusion, in this paper I use the term migrant worker (in its narrower sense) to describe 
all temporary foreign workers, while reserving the term temporary foreign worker (TFW) for 
those in the TFWP.    
3 The current federal Liberal government appointed a Parliamentary committee to review the 
Temporary Foreign Worker program in February 2016.  In September it recommended 21 
changes.  As of the date of writing, no action has been taken (CIC News, 2016).  The previous 
Conservative government introduced major reforms in 2014 (Employment and Social 
Development, 2014).   
4 The literature is voluminous.  For a small sample, see Nakache and Dixon Perea 2015; Faraday 
2014; Lenard and Straehle 2012; Marsden 2011; Sargeant and Tucker 2010; Fudge and McPhail 
2009. 
5 Mark Carney, then Governor of the Bank of Canada testified before the House of Commons 
that “One doesn't want an over-reliance, certainly, on temporary foreign workers for lower-
skilled jobs, which prevent the wage adjustment mechanism from making sure that Canadians 
are paid higher wages, but also so that firms improve their productivity as necessary….” Canada, 
House of Commons, Finance Committee, Meeting 115, (23 April 2013). 
6 The majority of workers in this category hold work permits for post-graduate employment 
followed by spouses of skilled workers. 
7 For example, the reciprocal employment group, the second largest category of IMPs, consists 
of young workers who are able to work in Canada through the International Experience Canada 
program, which consists of 32 bilateral agreements that provide young people with the 
opportunity to work and travel abroad.  Their experience in Canada has not been studied, but 
research in Australia (Robertson 2014) suggests they may be highly vulnerable to exploitation. 
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8 Retrieved from the front page of the CS Wind website at 
http://www.cswindcorp.com/eng/company/01_overview.asp. 
9 Most trade unions in Vietnam are led by the Communist Party and lack independence, although 
this may be changing (Anner & Liu 2016; Human Rights Watch 2009). 
10 According to records obtained through a freedom of information request, a complaint was 
received by the Employment Standards Branch of the Ministry of Labour alleging minimum 
wage and hours of work violations for 31 workers.  The source of complaint is not revealed, but 
there can be little doubt that the complaint was in reference to the 31 Vietnamese ICTs then 
working as CS Wind.  An Employment Standards Officer conducted an investigation and found 
monetary violations (the amount is unknown), presumably indicating that the Vietnamese 
workers were being paid less than the minimum wage or not being paid for their overtime hours, 
or both.  CS Wind paid the amount owing so no monetary order was issued.  However, a 
compliance order was issued with respect to record keeping.  A re-inspection was conducted a 
year later which found violations in relation to written agreements regarding vacation periods.   
11 The full name of the union is International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and 
Reinforcing Ironworkers, Local 721. 
12 Thibodeau testified at the labour board that both the use of TFWs and agency workers had 
been issues in the campaign, particularly about agency workers not being hired on directly by 
CSW (CS Wind 2015, para. 80). 
13 This was followed by a scandalous and unfounded claim by McNevin that Thibodeau tried to 
parlay his organizing into a supervisory position.  The OLRB characterized McNevin’s charge as 
an attempt to undermine the union on the eve of the election and an unfair labour practice (CS 
Wind 2015, paras. 77-78, 12). 
14 A third possibility, not proposed by either party, was that the employer was CSW Korea, but 
it is extremely unlikely that the labour board would have found that to be the case even if that 
option had been put on the table. 
15 For example, NAFTA covers American and Mexican business people engaging in business 
activities at a professional level, which is reflected in the list of covered occupations in NAFTA 
Appendix 16.03.D.1.  
16 In that case, the board restricted the scope of the union’s bargaining rights so that it could 
only negotiate over those terms and conditions that were unique to the SAWs. 
17 The condition that there had to be three permanent employees in order for agricultural 
workers to become unionized was successfully challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of 
freedom of association.  However, this did not turn out to be helpful for SAWs on farms without 
permanent workers because the government responded by creating a special and very weak 
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regime for making collective representations for workers in this situation (Tucker and Jowett, 
2014: 47-48). 
